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Abstract 
The sharing economy is a fast-growing business model, and the sharing resources have 
crept from physical assets (e.g., vehicles and houses) to intangible assets (e.g., skills 
and knowledge). Online knowledge-sharing platforms allow sharers to offer knowledge 
products in various forms and can generate revenue through charging users 
subscription and/or transaction fees.  How to charge bilateral users is an essential and 
complex decision-making problem that puzzles knowledge-sharing platforms. This 
study proposes a dynamic optimal pricing model that involves multiple development 
stages based on the optimal control theory. In addition, the inherent features of 
knowledge products and sharers’ social capitals are considered. The applicability and 
utility of the proposed model is verified through numerical experiments on an empirical 
dataset from the China’s largest knowledge-sharing platform named Zhihu. The results 
reveal that the platform can adjust its pricing strategies to achieve different 
optimization goals and this is conducive to its sustainable development.  
Keywords:  Dynamic pricing model, knowledge-sharing platforms, two-sided markets, 
knowledge-sharing economy 
 
Introduction 
With the development of community-based information technology and the emergence of Internet 
platforms, the sharing economy has achieved explosive growth. The sharing economy constructs new 
social connections, captures the most social value, and promotes the effective utilization of social 
resources. Users can conveniently share resources through third-party platforms (e.g., Airbnb, Uber, 
Lending Club, and Taskrabbit). The sharing mechanism contributes to promote the recirculation or 
intensive use of resources, and also enables people to access services more effectively and efficiently. 
CSIC (2017) reported that the market turnover of the sharing economy in 2016 was about 34,520 billion 
CNY and would continue to grow at an average annual rate of 40% in the coming years. At the early 
stage of the sharing economy, the sharing resources are often physical assets, such as houses, vehicles 
and clothes. Since 2016, with the development of this business model, the intangible assets (e.g., 
information, knowledge, and time) are started to be included.  
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Over the years, free and abundant Internet content has provided users with convenient access to 
information, but along with the increasing complexity of content filtering. It becomes more and more 
difficult and expensive for users to retrieve valuable and useful knowledge from the Internet. Through 
years of development, online knowledge-sharing platforms not only accumulate a large number of 
knowledge sharers, but also attract sufficient potential consumers who have strong willingness to pay 
for high-quality knowledge products. This results in that the knowledge-sharing gradually shifts from 
the free model to the paid model. The platform becomes an essential and efficient channel that connects 
the supply and demand sides of the knowledge-sharing economy. Having recognized this, many 
knowledge-sharing platforms begin to actively explore the plausibility of knowledge transformation and 
have developed a variety of forms of knowledge-sharing products (e.g., Zhihu Live, Fenda, and 
Himalaya FM) with promising results. It has been highlighted in CSIC (2017) that the market turnover 
in the area of knowledge and technology-sharing increased the most with the annual turnover reaching 
610 billion CNY in 2016, therefore the year of 2016 is so-called “the first year” for knowledge-sharing 
economy. 
In the knowledge-sharing market, there are two groups of users referred as knowledge sharers and 
knowledge consumers. In general, the knowledge-sharing platforms allow sharers to offer knowledge 
products in various form, and consumers can access products and communicate with sharers after 
purchases. For the generated revenues, there exist several widely adopted allocation mechanisms, 
including free of charge, charging transaction/fixed fees to sharers, and charging fees to both sharers 
and consumers. In order to retain existing active users and attract new users, platforms have to devote 
intensive human and financial resources for operations and promotions. At the beginning of platform 
development, platforms provide free services and even price subsidy for bilateral users. However, this 
is not conducive to the sustainable development of platforms. How to charge bilateral users is therefore 
an essential and complex decision-making problem that puzzles knowledge-sharing platforms. An 
optimal pricing model can provide pricing decision-making support for knowledge-sharing platforms to 
achieve operational goals, and it can also contribute to the sustainable development of knowledge-
sharing economy. Recently, researchers are getting interested in the knowledge-sharing economy, and 
most of the existing studies focus on exploring the influential factors of market participants’ willingness 
to share (Guan et al. 2018; Jin et al. 2015) or consume (Wang et al. 2013). However, research on the 
pricing strategies of online knowledge-sharing platforms is still scant. 
Being an emerging business model, there are several distinctive factors that need to be considered in the 
pricing model. First, the network effect is an important feature of two-sided markets, and it indicates 
that the utility of a user joining a platform is mainly depended on the quantity of other users on this 
platform (Armstrong 2006; Caillaud and Jullien 2003). Apart from the positive cross-group network 
effects that have been widely discussed in the literature, it is plausible that within-group network effects 
(Qiu et al. 2016) and negative cross-group network effects (Kim and Tse 2011) may also exist in 
knowledge-sharing platforms due to online interactions. Second, the innovative knowledge product 
plays a vital role in the knowledge-sharing market and it has some inherent features. For example, 
knowledge products may have different validity periods. Also, online knowledge-sharing platforms 
naturally include social network information. The social capital has an impact on the degree of benefits 
that bilateral users can obtain from knowledge products. Third, the development process of knowledge-
sharing platforms can be divided into different stages. A static pricing model with the single optimization 
goal (e.g., maximize short-run profits) may not be applicable to the problem at hand. 
In an effort to remedy the above pressing issues and challenges, this study proposes a dynamic optimal 
pricing model for online knowledge-sharing platforms in a monopoly market. In order to meet different 
optimization goals at different development stages, three stages are innovatively considered, including 
the start-up, the growth, and the maturity stage. In addition, features of knowledge products (e.g., 
validity rates and social capitals) and two-sided markets (e.g., network effects) are considered in the 
pricing model. The proposed model is built upon the diffusion models that are used in the existing works 
of Xie and Sirbu (1995) and Kim and Tse (2011). This optimal control problem can be transformed into 
a two-point boundary value problem and can be solved through the optimal control theory. Because the 
non-linear diffusion model is difficult to find the analytical solutions, the applicability and utility of the 
proposed model is verified through numerical experiments on an empirical dataset from the China’s 
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largest knowledge-sharing platform named Zhihu. Some model parameters are also estimated to ensure 
the feasibility of the numerical solutions. The obtained results indicate that the platform can apply 
different optimal pricing strategies to satisfy diverse operational goals at different stages.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: this study reviews the existing studies on the optimal 
pricing in two-sided markets, and then proposes a dynamic optimal pricing model in the following two 
sections. After that, the constructed optimal problem is numerically solved through an empirical dataset, 
and the obtained results are discussed. The last section concludes this study and puts forward directions 
for future research. 
Literature Review 
The two-sided market is a market where one or more platforms can promote effective interactions 
between the supply and demand sides and attract more users to join the platform through reasonable 
pricing (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Rochet and Tirole 2006). There are two significant features of two-
sided markets: the non-neutrality of price structure (Rochet and Tirole 2003) and network externality 
(Armstrong 2006). Considering that the non-neutrality of price structure is difficult to measure, the 
network externality, also named the network effect, is often used to indicate whether a market is two-
sided or not. The existence of network effects in two-sided markets has been empirically verified in 
online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending (Qiu et al. 2016), newspapers and magazines (Argentesi and 
Filistrucchi 2007; Kaiser and Wright 2006), television media (Wilbur 2008), yellow page advertising 
(Rysman 2004), online user-generated content (Albuquerque et al. 2012), and video games (Zhou 2017) 
markets. For example, Qiu et al. (2016) confirmed positive cross-group network effects in the online 
P2P lending market. When the market was in short supply, there also existed positive within-group 
network effects between lenders and negative within-group network effects between borrowers.  
Extant studies (Armstrong 2006; Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Hagiu 2004; Reisinger et al. 2009; Rochet 
and Tirole 2006) have established the general research framework of the platform optimal pricing. The 
optimal pricing structure is influenced by network effects (Armstrong 2006; Caillaud and Jullien 2003; 
Rochet and Tirole 2006), charge mode (Rochet and Tirole 2006), user's platform belonging (Armstrong 
2006), price elasticity of demand (Rochet and Tirole 2006), heterogeneity of users (Reisinger et al. 2009), 
and product differentiation (Hagiu 2004). For instance, Hagiu (2004) explored the impact of user 
preference on the optimal pricing and found that the stronger the user preference for product diversity 
was, the more profits the platform obtained from the supply side. In summary, the platform usually 
adopts a skewed pricing strategy to maximize its revenue, which indicates that the platform charges 
more fees to one side and subsidizes the other side. 
The network effect is the basis of platform pricing models. Li et al. (2010) has stated that there exist 
positive cross-group network effects between bilateral users in majority of cases, whereas the within-
group network effects are depended on the operation situation. For example, in television media 
platforms, cross-group network effects on audiences from advertisers are negative due to the audiences' 
aversion to advertisements (Ambrus et al. 2016; Reisinger et al. 2009). There are positive cross-group 
network effects between two-sided users in e-commerce platforms, while negative within-group 
network effects may exist between consumer groups (Li et al. 2011) and/or seller groups (Belleflamme 
and Toulemonde 2009; Yoo et al. 2002) due to the horizontal competition. In the bandwidth markets, in 
addition to the positive network effects between bilateral users, there are negative network crowding 
effects with the limitation of the network capacity (Guo and Easley 2016).  
Besides network effects, many studies have added other specific factors to the pricing model on the 
basis of the application features. For instance, Kim and Tse (2014) found that the equilibrium pricing 
strategy was depended on the transparency of searching information and the search quality of a platform 
in competitive search-engine markets. Hagiu and Spulber (2014) described the change of the platform 
equilibrium pricing in video game markets when end users had incomplete information on the price of 
developer. Gao (2017) proposed the conception of “mixed” two-sided markets where a user can be both 
buyers and sellers on e-commerce platforms, and also discussed whether a platform should adopt the 
bundle pricing strategies or not. 
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Existing literature on the optimal pricing is mainly based on the static model, which reveals the myopic 
behavior of users. In recent years, more and more researchers have explored the dynamic optimal pricing 
strategies (Filippas and Gramstad 2016; Garcia et al. 2014; Kim and Tse 2011; Sun and Tse 2007). For 
example, Kim and Tse (2011) discussed impacts of the complexity of knowledge, knowledge disuse 
rate, and cross-group network effects among questioners, answers, and accumulated knowledge on a 
dynamic optimal pricing model for an online Q&A platform, so as to provide suggestions on how to 
maintain the competitive advantage of this platform. Garcia et al. (2014) stated that the third party (i.e., 
the malicious users) in operating system markets had negative network effects on bilateral users, and 
the security of operating systems had important influence on platform competition. Different from the 
above literature based on network effects, Filippas and Gramstad (2016) analyzed the dynamic optimal 
pricing from the perspective of consumer cognition, and also found that the dynamic optimal pricing 
would follow the market-penetration pricing strategy when shared products wear out quickly.   
In summary, prior studies on the static optimal pricing mainly based on positive cross-group network 
effects in traditional two-sided markets (e.g., the media and e-commerce), and they assumed that 
platforms charged fixed fees to users. Considering characteristics (e.g. highly personalized content and 
high-frequency trading) of knowledge products, charging fixed fees no longer applies to online 
knowledge-sharing platforms. In addition, the static model emphasizes short-term benefits rather than 
the long-term benefits gained by platforms, and profit-making as the single goal of platforms is also 
unreasonable. Further, the online community environment brings new influential factors for the pricing 
model. Therefore, this work tackles the above issues and challenges to fill a gap in the literature. 
The Model 
Overview of Basic Assumptions 
According to the product lifecycle theory, a platform has different characteristics and development 
strategies to optimize at different stages. Existing works (Armstrong 2006; Kim and Tse 2011; Sun and 
Tse 2007) regarded profit maximization as the optimal goal, which seems not accord with the actual 
operations. Therefore, in order to better describe the whole process of platform development and 
optimize the operational goal, this study innovatively divides the process into three stages: the start-up, 
the growth, and the maturity stage, and constructs corresponding dynamic pricing models to design 
more reasonable pricing strategies. 
Network Effects and Price Structure 
This work studies dynamic optimal pricing policies under monopoly. Armstrong (2006) constructed the 
widely-used platform profit function and user utility function for the monopolistic two-sided network. 
It assumed that platform revenue came from the periodic fees charged to bilateral users, and the utility 
that one side users derived from joining the platform increased with the number of users on the other 
side and decreased with the fixed fees. Nowadays, an increasing number of online platforms offer free 
access to users for high user traffic, given the problem at hand, this work assumes that the platform only 
charges transaction fees to knowledge sharers while knowledge consumers can join the platform for free.  
There exist user-generated content (UGC) and platform-generated content (PGC) on the knowledge-
sharing platforms. User-shared knowledge products are UGC, while PGC originates from the bundle of 
UGC that platforms regard as high-quality and worthy of popularizing. Similar to the online knowledge 
Q&A platforms, the knowledge-sharing platforms also have few banner advertisements. However, the 
content of banner advertising is generally UGC or PGC, which is applied to moderately boost product 
exposure and would not disturb users. Both PGC and banner advertisements have less influence on users, 
so this work assumes that the major participants on the platforms are sharers and consumers, and there 
are cross-group network effects between the two groups. Considering the herd behavior in online social 
networks (Duan 2009; Sun 2013), within-group network effects are also taken into account. In addition 
to sharers and consumers, the accumulated knowledge products on online knowledge-sharing platforms 
are another essential factor in attracting bilateral users (Kim and Tse 2011). In general, the positivity 
and negativity of network effects are depended on the operation situation (Li et al. 2010). In this study, 
the platform has different characteristics at each stage, so the positive and negative network effects vary 
 Dynamic Optimal Pricing Strategies for Knowledge-Sharing Platforms 
  
 Twenty-Second Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, Japan 2018 
in different stages. Figure 1 depicts network effects among three groups at different stages, where + and 
- represent positive and negative network effects, respectively. 
 
Figure 1.  Network Effects at Different Stages 
Parameters of Knowledge Products 
The parameter 𝜂 ∈ [0,1] refers to the knowledge product validity rate and higher 𝜂 means the knowledge 
product has a longer life-time and upgrades slowly. In Zhihu Live platform, some knowledge products 
(e.g., artistic classic interpretations and summaries of basic subject knowledge) have a relatively longer 
life-time, while others (e.g., tips for how to choose cost-effective products on Black Friday 2017 and 
suggestions of how to prepare for the 2017 college entrance examination) update very fast. In the long 
run, knowledge products with longer life-time have more impacts on platform than those with shorter 
life-time. For instance, the long-lived knowledge products may weaken the strength of network effects 
between sharers and consumers, because the demand of consumers can be satisfied from existing 
accumulated knowledge products. 
Second, the social capital also has an impact on the degree of benefits that bilateral users can obtain 
from accumulated knowledge products. Zhihu Live platform relies on the largest online Q&A 
community Zhihu in China, so the parameter 𝜃 ∈ [0,1] represents a sharer's social characteristics (e.g., 
the number of followers and the number of received thanks). The greater value of 𝜃 represents that the 
sharer has a greater impact, and s/he is more likely to participate in community activities (e.g., 
knowledge contribution behavior) continuously (Guan et al. 2018). For example, new Lives created by 
sharers who have a large number of followers will attract more fans to purchase. Note that each 
knowledge product has its own validity rate and social capital, the average 𝜂 and 𝜃 of accumulated 
knowledge products represent knowledge characteristics of the platform. Since accumulated knowledge 
products vary with stages, the value of parameters will be different at each stage. 
The Diffusion Model 
In a monopoly market, an optimal control problem to optimize the platform's utility is often based on 
the assumption of users' myopic behavior, which indicates that Internet users join the platform primarily 
depending on the current user scale and accumulated knowledge product scale. According to the 
dynamic diffusion model proposed in extant research (Kim and Tse 2011; Xie and Sirbu 1995), it 
assumes the diffusion process is closely related to the difference (i.e., the unsatisfied demand) between 
the potential demand and the current demand. Therefore, this study assumes that the diffusion speed of 
bilateral users (i.e., ?̇?(𝑡), and 	?̇?(𝑡)) is proportional to the unsatisfied demand, and the diffusion speed of 
accumulated knowledge products (i.e., ?̇?(𝑡)) is proportional to the difference between the instantaneous 
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growth of new knowledge products and reduction of obsolete knowledge products. The potential 
demand is determined by network effects and the price effect. The general form of the diffusion model 
can be represented as follows: ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝜆{𝐷5[𝐵(𝑡), 𝑆(𝑡), 𝐾(𝑡)] − 𝐵(𝑡)}                                                                ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝜇{𝐷9[𝐵(𝑡), 𝑆(𝑡), 𝐾(𝑡), 𝑝9(𝑡)] − 𝑆(𝑡)} ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝐺<[𝐵(𝑡), 𝑆(𝑡), 𝐾(𝑡)] − (1 − 𝜂)𝐾(𝑡)																																																										(1) 
where 𝑏, 𝑠, and 𝑘 represent consumers, sharers, and accumulated knowledge products, respectively. 𝐵(𝑡), 𝑆(𝑡), 𝐾(𝑡), and 𝑝9(𝑡) are the numbers of consumers, sharers, accumulated knowledge products, and 
per transaction fee charged to sharers, respectively, at time 𝑡. 𝐷@(𝑡) (𝑖 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑠}) refers to the potential 
demand, which is affected by network effects in Figure 1. 𝐺<(𝑡) represents the instantaneous growth of 
new accumulated knowledge products, and 1 − 𝜂 is the disuse rate of accumulated knowledge products. 𝜆 ∈ [0,1] and 𝜇 ∈ [0,1] are diffusion rates of consumers and sharers, respectively. The growth rate of 
consumers or sharers is proportional to the unsatisfied consumer or sharer demand with coefficient 𝜆 or 𝜇, respectively, and the coefficient varies in different stage. 
Assume that a general form of the objective function at all stages is 𝜋(𝑡). The optimal control problem 
in this work is to maximize the following function under constraints Equation (1):  𝑚𝑎𝑥FG ∫ 𝑒JKL𝜋(𝑡) 𝑑𝑡NLO 																																																																													(2)		
Combined with the Pontryagin maximum principle (Aseev and Kryazhimskiy 2004), the above optimal 
control problem can be converted into a 6×6 two-point boundary value problem (TPBVP). Due to the 
space limit, the conversion steps are omitted herein. For state variables, the initial value at the growth 
and maturity stage is the terminal value at its previous stage. The zero-initial value at the start-up stage 
makes the network unable to grow over time, a positive number is assigned to overcome the “chicken 
and egg” problem (Caillaud and Jullien 2003). For costate variables, when 𝑇 in Equation (2) is finite, 
the terminal value is zero; when 𝑇 is infinite, the terminal value conforms to the transversality conditions. 
The Start-up Stage 
At the start-up stage, a small-scale platform has to dedicate significant resources to amassing new active 
users as many as possible. Therefore, the operational goal at this stage is to maximize the scale of 
bilateral users. Social attributes of the Zhihu platform can change user’s behavior patterns. Motivations, 
such as one’s curiosity, perceived value (e.g., internal satisfaction and professional reputation), peer 
recognition, and group-size effects, are important for one’s active participation (Jin et al. 2015). For 
instance, verified users with high impact and/or more social relations joining the platform can promote 
more users to join. Such social attributes can be reflected through knowledge products’ social capital 𝜃. 
At this stage, this work assumes that the factor influencing the potential users’ participation is the user 
scale, and the function of the platform utility and state equations are defined as: 𝑚𝑎𝑥FG ∫ 𝑒JKL[𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑆(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡LTU                                                                                             ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝜆{𝑏VW𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑏XW𝑆(𝑡) − 𝐵(𝑡)}                                                                             ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝜇 Y𝑏ZW𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑏[W𝑆(𝑡) − 𝑟9(𝐵(𝑡) × 𝑝9(𝑡))X − 𝑆(𝑡)] ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝐵(𝑡)𝐿 + 𝐵(𝑡)W𝑆(𝑡)																																																																																																												(3) 
where 𝑏V and 𝑏X  are benefits for consumers from consumers and sharers, respectively; 𝑏Z and 𝑏[ are 
effects of consumers and sharers on sharers, respectively; and 𝑟9 refers to the price sensitivity of sharers. 
This study chooses the quadratic form of price to satisfy the assumption that the higher the price is, the 
faster the potential demand declines. On the other hand, the non-linear form also helps to avoid possible 
Bang-Bang control solutions in the optimal control problem (Sun and Tse 2007). A new knowledge 
product created by a sharer joins the accumulated knowledge products pool only when consumers 
purchase it. In general, in the period of ∆𝑡, sharers would like to share W𝑆(𝑡) knowledge products, of 
which 𝐵(𝑡) (𝐿 + 𝐵(𝑡))⁄  become new accumulated knowledge products with the limitation of consumer 
purchase intention. 𝐿 is a large positive constant to control the purchase probability of consumers. 
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The Growth Stage 
With the development of the platform, it has accumulated a certain number of users and knowledge 
products. Factors at the start-up stage are no longer the only factor for potential bilateral users to 
participate, and users are gradually focusing on accumulated knowledge products. In order to cater to 
the growing demand of consumers for the content and further attract new users, the platform is dedicated 
to improving the quality and variety of accumulated knowledge products, which can enhance user utility 
obtained from the platform. Therefore, at the growth stage, the platform's operational goal is to 
maximize the utility of bilateral users. Besides the user scale, the accumulated knowledge product 
scale is another reason for users joining the platform. The platform utility function and the diffusion 
model are expressed as follows: 𝑚𝑎𝑥FG ∫ 𝑒JKL[𝑈5(𝑡) + 𝑈9(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡LcLT                                                        ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝜆{𝑏V(1 + θ)W𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑏XW𝑆(𝑡) + 𝑏ZW𝐾(𝑡) − 𝐵(𝑡)}                                 ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝜇 e𝑏[(1 + θ)W𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑏fW𝑆(𝑡) + 𝑏gW𝐾(𝑡) − 11 + θ 𝑟9(𝐵(𝑡) × 𝑝9(𝑡))X − 𝑆(𝑡)h ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝐵(𝑡)𝐿 + 𝐵(𝑡)W𝑆(𝑡) − (1 − 𝜂)𝐾(𝑡)																																																																																																							(4) 
with the utility function 𝑈@(𝑡) (𝑖 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑠}) of bilateral users e𝑈5(𝑡) = 𝛼5𝐵(𝑡) + 𝛽5𝑆(𝑡) + 𝛾5𝐾(𝑡)																						𝑈9(𝑡) = 𝛼9𝑆(𝑡) + 𝛽9𝐵(𝑡) + 𝛾9𝐾(𝑡) − 𝑝9(𝑡)𝐵(𝑡) 
where 𝛼@  is the within-group network effects coefficient, 𝛽@  and 𝛾@  refer to the cross-group network 
effects coefficient. 𝑏V, 𝑏X, and 𝑏Z are benefits of the network product or service for consumers from 
consumers, sharers, accumulated knowledge products, respectively. 𝑏[ , 𝑏f , and 𝑏g  are benefits for 
sharers from consumers, sharers, accumulated knowledge products, respectively. The validity rate 
primarily affects the change of knowledge product scale, while the social capital is the main factor 
influencing user scale changes. The higher social capital indicates that the degree of benefits for sharers 
from consumers is enhanced due to the fan effect; on the other hand, because of the conformity, it 
increases the degree of benefits for consumers themselves and also decreases the price sensitivity of 
sharers. There are a small number of Lives involving specific events (e.g., the Spring Festival, and Tmall 
11/11 Shopping Festival) that are prone to invalidation. (1 − 𝜂)𝐾(𝑡) is the proportion of accumulated 
knowledge products that have been eliminated due to invalidation. 
The Maturity Stage 
The platform has reached a plateau when the user structure is stable and accumulated knowledge 
products become abundant at the maturity stage. The platform struggles to achieve the goal of 
maximizing revenues. In general, accumulated knowledge products have negative cross-group network 
effects on sharers, but positive cross-group network effects on consumers (Kim and Tse 2011). With the 
increasing number of accumulated knowledge products, some new knowledge products are likely to 
replace similar existing knowledge products with premium content or lower price, which inhibits the 
willingness of sharing knowledge and slows down the production of new knowledge product. The 
objective function and state equations of the optimal control problem are represented as follows: 𝑚𝑎𝑥FG ∫ 𝑒JKL[(𝑝9(𝑡) − 𝑐)𝐵(𝑡)𝑆(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡nLc   ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝜆{𝑏V(1 + θ)W𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑏X1 + 𝜂W𝑆(𝑡) + 𝑏Z(1 + 𝜂)W𝐾(𝑡) − 𝐵(𝑡)} ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝜇 e𝑏[(1 + θ)W𝐵(𝑡) − 𝑏fW𝑆(𝑡) − 𝑏g(1 + 𝜂)W𝐾(𝑡) − 1(1 + θ)(1 + 𝜂) 𝑟9(𝐵(𝑡) × 𝑝9(𝑡))X − 𝑆(𝑡)h ?̇?(𝑡) = o1 − (1 + 𝜂)𝐾(𝑡)𝑀 +𝐾(𝑡) q 𝐵(𝑡)𝐿 + 𝐵(𝑡)W𝑆(𝑡) − (1 − 𝜂)𝐾(𝑡)																																																																																										(5) 
where 𝑐 is the average cost of each transaction, including average fixed cost and average variable cost. 
Fixed cost refers to fixed expenses of platform operations, and variable cost mainly comes from network 
traffic. Consumers can acquire knowledge through accumulated knowledge products and sharers. The 
validity rate adjusts the degree of benefits that consumers obtain from sharers and accumulated 
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knowledge products. The higher validity rate implies consumers get more benefits from accumulated 
knowledge products and are more likely to purchase accumulated knowledge products rather than new 
knowledge product to be shared. The competition between sharers and accumulated knowledge products 
inhibits the active participation of potential sharers. Higher validity rate means more intense competition, 
which leads to greater losses incurred by accumulated knowledge products for sharers. Besides, an 
extension of the validity prolongs sharers' earning period, therefore decreasing the price sensitivity. 
During the time between 𝑡 and 𝑡 + ∆𝑡, sharers will share W𝑆(𝑡) knowledge products, the proportion of 
consumers willing to buy is 𝐵(𝑡) (𝐿 + 𝐵(𝑡))⁄ , and the probability of accumulated knowledge products 
meeting the purchasing needs of consumers is (1 + 𝜂)𝐾(𝑡) (𝑀 +𝐾(𝑡))⁄ . 𝑀 is a large positive constant to 
control the probability of demands being satisfied by accumulated knowledge products. 
Numerical Experiments 
The above optimal control problem can be solved through the optimal control theory (Aseev and 
Kryazhimskiy 2004). This TPBVP contains 6 non-linear differential equations and 6 dynamic variables. 
It is difficult to derive the analytical solutions, therefore, the TPBVP is solved numerically through an 
empirical dataset. MATLAB package bvp4c provides a feasible way to solve a TPBVP (Kierzenka and 
Shampine 2001), and it is employed in this study. Due to space limit, the implementations of solving 
the TPBVP are omitted herein. The growth of bilateral users and accumulated knowledge products, and 
the dynamic optimal pricing path at different stages are numerically simulated in this section. 
The Dataset 
Zhihu is the China’s largest online knowledge-sharing platforms and it released a real-time interactive 
knowledge-sharing product, known as Zhihu Live1, in May 2016. Zhihu Live allows knowledge sharers 
to provide knowledge products in the form of “Live” on the platform. Within a Live, a share’s skills, 
experiences, and knowledge are transformed through PPT, text, voice, and video. Once a consumer 
purchased a Live, s/he can access all the delivered materials and can even communicate with the share 
in real time. This is one of the most distinct features between Live and other information goods. As one 
of the earliest and most successful knowledge-sharing platforms in China, Zhihu Live has attracted a 
large number of active users since it was launched. As of 1 December 2017, 7,122 Lives have been held 
on this platform, and they bring in more than 4.28 million purchases with a repurchase rate of 42%. The 
data used in this study is collected from Zhihu Live platform, and it contains the transaction data during 
the period from 27 April 2016 to 29 November 2017. The dataset consists of three groups: sharers, 
consumers, and knowledge products. The involved attributes in this study are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Description of Attributes  
Groups Attributes Description 
Sharers 
Shared_count The number of a sharer's answers being shared 
Voted_count The number of a sharer's answers being voted up 
Favorited_count The number of a sharer's answers being favorited 
Follower_count The number of a sharer's followers 
Thanked_count The number of a sharer's answers being thanked 
Consumers Purchase_time The timestamp of a consumer purchasing a Live 
Knowledge products 
(i.e., Lives) 
Created_time The timestamp that a Live being created 
End_time The timestamp that a Live being finished sharing 
Note: The data of purchase_time starts from 22 May 2017 due to the incomplete data collection. 
Parameters Estimation 
In this study, a Live's creation time, a consumer's purchasing time, and a Live's end time (i.e., 
created_time, purchase_time, and end_time) are regarded as the time of sharers, consumers and 
                                                   
1 https://www.zhihu.com/lives 
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accumulated knowledge products accessing the platform, respectively. The numbers of bilateral users 
and accumulated knowledge products would change over time, and they can be counted. Due to an order 
of magnitude difference in scale, this work takes the logarithm of bilateral user scale. According to 
Equation (1), the growth rate of the network (i.e.,	?̇?(𝑡) and 	?̇?(𝑡)) is proportional to the unsatisfied 
demand. In order to simplify the calculation, this study regards the current demand 𝐼(𝑡 + 1) (𝐼 ∈ {𝐵, 𝑆}) 
at time 𝑡 + 1 as the potential demand 𝐷@(𝑡) (𝑖 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑠}) at time 𝑡 to calculate the diffusion rate (i.e., 𝜆(𝑡) 
and 𝜇(𝑡)) at time 𝑡. Consequently, the diffusion rate (i.e., 𝜆 and 𝜇) at a certain stage is the average of 
rates (i.e., 𝜆(𝑡) and 𝜇(𝑡), respectively) during a given time period. 
In addition to the diffusion rate, the social capital 𝜃 can be measured by the social interaction data among 
users. The statistical characteristics of social capital related attributes are summarized in Table 2. As 
shown in Table 2, the data is highly skewed, and there is a wide divergence among individuals. To 
address this, this study takes the logarithm of each attribute, and adopts the min-max normalization 
method to normalize the data. The social capital of each knowledge product is the mean of such attributes’ 
values. The social capital 𝜃t (𝑗 ∈ {𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝, 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦}) of the platform takes the average of the 
social capital of all knowledge products, and such products have been accumulated from the birth of the 
platform to the end of a certain stage. Considering the validity rate 𝜂, platform's social capital 𝜃 is equal 
to 𝜃 = 𝜂 × 𝜃t. For remaining parameters that can not be estimated by the available data, this work pre-
defines their values based on the extant research (Kaiser and Wright 2006; Kim and Tse 2011; Sun and 
Tse 2007). It has been pointed out in Sun and Tse (2007) that the network is able to exceed the critical 
value and achieve growth when values of the network benefits are sufficiently large. Taken into account 
of these factors, this work adjusts the parameter values (e.g., benefits parameter 𝑏, probability control 
parameter 𝐿, 𝑀) to meet the experimental requirements. 
Table 2. Statistical Characteristics of Social Capital Related Attributes 
Attributes Min Max Mean S.D. Skewness 
Follower_count 0 1,438,963 23,615.482 74,121.271 8.637 
Shared_count 0 19,238 125.537 714.623 15.596 
Voted_count 0 3,950,197 30,689.333 115,082.427 21.418 
Favorited_count 0 1,212,634 22,424.128 65,039.907 7.631 
Thanked_count 0 598,019 6,314.246 20,039.835 15.062 
Numerical Results 
The Start-up Stage 
This work takes the period from 27 April 2016 to 31 August 2016 as the start-up stage, because the 
collected data reveals that the daily number of new Lives is relatively small and accumulated knowledge 
products are increasing slowly within this time period. Given that the small-scale accumulated 
knowledge products have limit effects on attracting users, network effects between bilateral users are 
the major factor for new users joining. In addition, effective measures have not been taken to accelerate 
the development of the platform. The values of model parameters at this stage are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Parameters and Values at the Start-Up Stage 
Parameters Values 𝑡V (time span) 127 𝜆, 𝜇 (diffusion rates) 0.15, 0.26 𝑟 (discounted rate) 0.05 𝑟9 (price-sensitivity parameter) 1 𝐿 (consuming probability control parameter) 5000 𝑏V, 𝑏X, 𝑏Z, 𝑏[ (benefits parameters) 20, 20, 10, 5 𝐵(0), 𝑆(0), 𝐾(0) (initial conditions) 10, 5, 2 
 
The numerical solution is depicted in Figure 2, where the horizontal axis is timeline and the vertical axis 
represents the numerical value. By default, timeline (i.e., the units on the X-axis) is shown in days. 
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Figure 2 shows that both consumers and sharers have achieved growth. Since benefits for consumers 
(i.e., 𝑏V and 𝑏X) are greater than those for sharers (i.e., 𝑏Z and 𝑏[), the growth of consumers is much faster. 
The user scale tends to be stable around time 60 due to the saturation of network effects. It is likely that 
some new knowledge products do not meet the demand of consumers, or sharers eventually give up 
sharing. Therefore, the number of accumulated knowledge products increases slowly but steadily. In 
order to attract as many users as possible, the platform offers free access to bilateral users throughout 
this stage, and this is consistent with the real scenario. 
 
Figure 2.  Numerical Results at the Start-Up Stage 
The Growth Stage 
The period from 1 September 2016 to 30 April 2017 is regarded as the growth stage, because the 
available data reveals that the growth rate of accumulated knowledge products has obviously improved. 
During this stage, the platform has taken actions to accelerate its development. Varied sales promotions 
(e.g., discounts, bonuses, and advertisement) have been carried out to attract users since September 2016. 
In addition, the platform has devoted great efforts to enhance network effects by introducing more 
influential sharers since October 2016. Also, Zhihu officially launched the Zhihu Bookstore in 
September 2016, which reflects the fact that Zhihu is intended to build an integrated knowledge payment 
platform. Zhihu Live, as the core paid knowledge product, its operational goal is also expected to change, 
because the platform attaches more importance to the content of knowledge products to maximize the 
utility of bilateral users. Parameters and their values at this stage are summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4. Parameters and Values at the Growth Stage 
Parameters Values 𝑡X (time span) 369 𝜆, 𝜇 (diffusion rates) 0.1, 0.15 𝑟 (discounted rate) 0.05 θ (knowledge social capital) 0.68 𝜂 (knowledge validity rate) 0.95 𝑟9 (price-sensitivity parameter) 1 𝐿 (consuming probability control parameter) 15000 𝑏V, 𝑏X, 𝑏Z, 𝑏[, 𝑏f, 𝑏g (benefits parameters) 50, 50, 50, 15, 5, 5 α}, α~, β}, β~, γ}, γ~ (network effects parameters) 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2,0.2 𝐵(127), 𝑆(127), 𝐾(127) (initial conditions) 1069, 431, 398 
 
The numerical solutions at the growth stage are depicted in Figure 3. Compared to the previous stage, 
benefits from consumers (i.e., 𝑏V and 𝑏[) and sharers (i.e., 𝑏X) for bilateral users are higher. Together 
with the benefits brought from accumulated knowledge products (i.e., 𝑏Z and 𝑏g), the increase in user 
scale is larger. On the other hand, because benefits from three groups for consumers are larger than those 
for sharers, the quantity of consumers increases the fastest. The user scale eventually stabilizes near time 
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230 due to the saturation of network effects. The number of accumulated knowledge products initially 
decreases and then increases. Due to the small-scale sharers and insufficient purchasing intention of 
consumers, the number of accumulated knowledge products shows a decline at the early growth stage. 
However, along with the increase of users, the number of newly generated knowledge products is larger 
than that of old disused knowledge products, so the number of accumulated knowledge products begins 
to rise and finally stabilizes at the later stage of growth. Considering the operational goal of this stage is 
to maximize the utility of bilateral users, the platform can provide a transaction fee subsidy for sharers 
and further amass active users. The negative optimal price in Figure 3 indicates the price subsidy, which 
coincides with the actual situation. 
 
Figure 3.  Numerical Results at the Growth Stage 
The Maturity Stage 
This study regards the period from 1 May 2017 on as the maturity stage. It is known that Zhihu Live has 
charged 30% of each transaction as the transaction fee to gain revenue since May 2017, and the 
remainder is owned by sharers. In addition, Zhihu Market released in May 2017 further integrated four 
kinds of paid knowledge products: Zhihu Live, online bookstore, paid consulting, and private classes, in 
order to provide a uniform entrance for users. This indicates that Zhihu has realized the transition to a 
paid knowledge-sharing platform from a free Q&A community. Charging transaction fees to sharers 
represents that the platform regards maximization profits as its operational goal. Parameters and their 
values at this stage are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5. Parameters and Values at the Maturity Stage 
Parameters Values 𝜆, 𝜇 (diffusion rates) 0.07, 0.13 𝑟 (discounted rate) 0.05 θ (knowledge social capital) 0.49 𝜂 (knowledge validity rate) 0.7 𝑐 (average cost) 0.01 𝑟9 (price-sensitivity parameter) 1 𝑀 (demanding probability control parameter) 600 𝐿 (consuming probability control parameter) 16000 𝑏V, 𝑏X, 𝑏Z, 𝑏[, 𝑏f, 𝑏g (benefits parameters) 60, 60, 60, 5, 10, 10 𝐵(369), 𝑆(369), 𝐾(369) (initial conditions) 14062, 3397, 564 
 
Figure 4 depicts the numerical results at the maturity stage. Although benefits from bilateral users (i.e., 𝑏V and 𝑏X) and accumulated knowledge products (i.e., 𝑏Z) for consumers slightly increase compared to 
the growth stage, the increase in the consumer scale has slowed down due to a small increase in the 
number of sharers and a decrease in the number of accumulated knowledge products. The saturation of 
network effects causes the consumer scale to reach a steady state around time 440. The increase in the 
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number of consumers has a positive effect on the sharers’ growth at the early maturity stage. However, 
fewer benefits from consumers (i.e., 𝑏[), losses from sharers and accumulated knowledge products (i.e., 𝑏f and 𝑏g), and transaction fees (i.e., 𝑝9) all lead to a slight decrease in the sharer scale at the later stage 
of maturity. Reasons for the significant decline in the number of accumulated knowledge products are 
the slower speed of knowledge product generation, which is caused by a reduction in the sharer scale 
and consumers’ consumption preference for accumulated knowledge products; for another, the faster 
speed of knowledge product disuse due to market saturation and severe competition. The knowledge-
sharing market has gradually matured, so the platform can charge sharers transaction fees to gain some 
revenue, and it is in consonance with the practical condition. 
 
Figure 4.  Numerical Results at the Maturity Stage 
In summary, at the start-up stage, the small-scale platform adopts the free strategy to expand the user 
scale; as the user scale has stabilized under the strategy of free access, the platform subsidizes sharers 
at the growth stage to further amass users and improve the user utility. At the maturity stage, since the 
platform has accumulated the sufficient numbers of users and accumulated knowledge products, income 
can be obtained by charging sharers transaction fees. The above results are consistent with the actual 
situation of Zhihu Live platform. The small-scale Zhihu Live has taken actions (e.g., discounts, bonuses, 
coupons, and the introduction of external resources) to amass users at early stages. When the platform 
grows to a certain size and gains enough influence, it begins to charge transaction fees to sharers for 
revenues. In addition, because Zhihu Live is one of the largest and most successful online knowledge-
sharing platforms in China, those optimal pricing strategies, which are compliant with the real scenario, 
also provide guidance for other emerging knowledge-sharing platforms. It can also help these platforms 
design more customized pricing strategies according to their development.  
Conclusion and Future Directions 
This study proposes a dynamic optimal pricing model for online knowledge-sharing platforms in the 
monopoly two-sided market. Based on the optimal control theory, the pricing problem at hand can be 
converted to a two-point boundary value problem, and it can be numerically solved to derive the optimal 
pricing strategies. The proposed model has been applied to an empirical dataset from the China’s largest 
knowledge-sharing platform. Some parameters are also estimated to ensure the feasibility of the 
numerical solutions according to the available data. The results indicate that the scale of bilateral users 
and accumulated knowledge products, and the dynamic optimal pricing path finally stabilize due to the 
saturation of network effects. The optimal pricing strategies at different stages are consistent with the 
practical conditions of Zhihu Live platform. The platform applies the free or price subsidy strategy to 
expand the user scale and increase the user utility at early stages. It then charges transaction fees to 
sharers to gain revenues when the platform is mature. It is also advantageous for burgeoning knowledge-
sharing platforms to devise more appropriate pricing strategies to their long-term development.  
This study has several theoretical and practical contributions. First, since the development trajectory of 
the platform presents a life-cycle trend, the entire development process is innovatively divided into three 
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stages, namely, the start-up, the growth, and the maturity stage. Then, the prior research generally builds 
a static pricing model to gain short-term benefits, the construction of a dynamic optimal pricing model 
can help the platform to better develop pricing strategies. Second, different kinds of network effects and 
the inherent features of knowledge products (e.g., validity rate and social capital) are taken into account 
in the pricing model. For example, because accumulated knowledge products have important effects for 
attracting bilateral users on platforms, network effects of accumulated knowledge products are 
considered. Also, due to the herd behavior in online social networks (Duan 2009; Sun 2013), the within-
group network effects are included and discussed. Third, different from existing studies, some of the 
model parameters are derived from the collected empirical data. This enables the proposed model 
provide more practical implications. Further, the proposed pricing model is general, and it can be readily 
applied to other online knowledge-sharing platforms to provide pricing decision support. Such platforms 
can choose the most appropriate pricing strategy according to their development stages. This also 
contributes to the sustainable development of the knowledge-sharing economy, and it helps to form a 
mature business model of this industry. 
Although some preliminary promising results have obtained, this study inevitably has several limitations 
that may trigger further research. The dynamic pricing model is built on the assumption of network 
effects. Although such effects have been greatly discussed and verified in prior studies, they can also be 
empirically examined by using the available dataset. Second, the robustness checks of model parameters 
(e.g., the knowledge product validity rate, social capital, and benefits of the network) will be conducted 
in the future work. Third, this work studies optimal pricing strategies under the monopoly, pricing 
strategies under competitive environment will be further discussed. 
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